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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
in such decisions, 66 and the effect upon the infant who must wait
through both an arbitration and a court proceeding, when the arbi-
tration may be of questionable value.
In short, Agur signifies the judiciary's reluctance to compel
arbitration in child custody disputes where it finds arbitration to be
a less than adequate solution. The value and desirability of arbitration
are for the court to determine in each situation, especially when it
is concerned with the more weighty problems of custody. If the arbi-
tration agreement of the parties is not an adequate remedy, the court
will not enforce it. However, the well-drafted document, which pro-
vides for a qualified, mutually acceptable panel of arbitrators, should
continue to be honored and enforced by the courts.
CPLR 7501: Consolidations of arbitrations permissible unless prej-
udice would thereby result.
In Met Food Corp. v. M. Eisenberg & Brothers, Inc.167 a general
contractor, The Heyward-Robinson Company, Inc. [hereinafter Hey-
ward], and an electrical contractor M. Eisenberg & Brothers, Inc. [here-
inafter Eisenberg], had each provided for arbitration clauses in their
separate construction contracts with Met Food Corporation [herein-
after Met]. Under the terms of the arbitration clauses, each party was
to appoint one arbitrator, with a third to be chosen by the two already
appointed. The agreements also contained a provision with respect
to Met's right to indemnification for any claims asserted against it by
one contractor for damages caused by any other contractor employed by
Met.
Eisenberg subsequently served a notice to arbitrate on Met. Pur-
suant to their agreements, each party appointed an arbitrator, and
a third member of the panel was duly chosen. However, Met then
sought to enjoin the arbitration pending the joinder of Heyward as
a party, asserting that it had subsequently learned that many of Eisen-
berg's claims were "predicated upon 'omissions and misdeeds' of Hey-
ward."168
The court reasoned that even under the CPA, pursuant to which
joinders and consolidations were unquestionably proper in light of
the fact that arbitration was then itself a special proceeding, consolida-
tion could not be ordered in a situation such as the present one. Unless
either Eisenberg or Heyward waived its right to participate in the
166 See CPLR 7511(b).
167 59 Misc. 2d 498, 299 N.Y.S.2d 696 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1969).
168 Id. at 500, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 698.
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selection of arbitrators, opined the court, the consolidation would be
prejudicial since the non-participating party would be precluded from
exercising its full rights under the arbitration agreement.
It is difficult to take issue with the reasoning of the court, which,
standing alone, is supported by sufficient precedent to warrant denial
of Met's petition.169 However, the court added:
[S]ince the enactment of the CPLR, arbitrations are no longer con-
sidered special proceedings (CPLR 7502) thus depriving the courts
of the statutory power, formerly authorized under the Civil
Practices [sic] Act, to consolidate arbitrations of controversies....
Just as arbitrations are no longer subject to consolidation, because
they are neither actions nor special proceedings, they surely are also
exempt from such procedural regulation by the courts ... , as
third party practice (CPLR 1007) or joinder of parties (CPLR
1001).170
It would seem that the court erred in reaching this conclusion. As
support for its lack of power to consolidate arbitrations under the
CPLR, the court relied upon the appellate division opinion in In re
Chariot Textiles Corp. 17 However, prior to the instant decision, the
Court of Appeals had reversed the Chariot case, 172 adopting the ap-
pellate division dissent 73 which held that the courts may still order
consolidations under CPLR 7502. The practitioner should therefore
avoid placing reliance upon the Met Food dictum. 74
CPLR 7502: Federal Arbitration Act is controlling in petition for a
stay of arbitration in maritime action.
In Ludwig Mowinckels Rederi v. Dow Chemical Co.,175 the Ap-
pellate Division, First Department, was petitioned to stay an arbi-
tration demanded in connection with a contract for furnishing tankers
for the carriage of chemicals. The contract contained an arbitration
agreement and a provision incorporating certain sections of the Car-
riage of Goods by Sea Act,17 6 thereby providing for the discharge of
169 See, e.g., In re Symphony Fabrics Corp., 16 App. Div. 2d 473, 229 N.Y.S.2d 200 (Ist
Dep't 1962), aft'd, 12 N.Y.2d 409, 190 N.E.2d 418, 240 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1963).
170 59 Misc. 2d at 501, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 699.
171 21 App. Div. 2d 762, 250 N.Y.S.2d 493 (Ist Dep't 1964).
172 18 N.Y.2d 793, 221 N.E.2d 913, 275 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1966). See The Quarterly Survey
of New York Practice, 43 ST. JoHN's L. R-v. 686, 704-05 (1969).
173 21 App. Div. 2d at 763, 250 N.Y.S.2d at 494 (dissenting opinion).
174 See In re Vigo Steamship Corp., 32 App. Div. 2d 10, 299 N.Y.S.2d 200 (1st Dep't
1969), where the court reached a result similar to that in Met Food by denying con-
solidation because substantial prejudice might occur. However, the Vigo court recognized
that such consolidations might otherwise be proper.
175 31 App. Div. 2d 372, 297 N.Y.S.2d 1011 (lst Dep't 1969).
17646 U.S.C. §§ 1363(6), 1304 & 1311 (1964).
[VOL. 44
